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Chapter 7 
The Double Fragmentation of Law: 
Legal System-Internal Differentiation and the Process of Europeanization 
Jennifer Hendry
*
 
 
Introduction 
In the introduction to this volume, Augenstein and Dawson state that ‘many scholars today 
are concerned with the perceived differentiation and pluralisation of European law and its 
acquis communautaire’.1 These concerns coalesce around the notion that, deprived of a 
Grundnorm and placed in a polycentric and pluralist constitutional setting, European Union 
law often seems to fall prey to instability and fragmentation. Similarly, it could be said that 
while law owes its elevated position within the European integration process to its 
(ubiquitous) agency on behalf of other function systems, such as politics and the economy, 
this has arguably come at the expense of its own internal coherence. I say arguably, although 
it is unlikely that any such argument would be forthcoming – much of the current literature in 
the field tends to concern itself with the ‘irregularities’ of law within European Union, 
pointing out a flaw here, an erosion of either form or influence there. By the same token, a 
common popular perspective on the EU integration process is that recently it has been 
faltering, suffering setback after setback in the form of, for example: the opt-outs from EMU 
and the limited recognition of freedom of movement for nationals of new accession States 
                                                 
*
 I am grateful to both Oliver Gerstenberg and Dagmar Schiek for their comments; any errors remain my own. 
1
 See Augenstein and Dawson, infra, What Law for what Polity? Legal Integration in the European Union 
Revisited. 
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creating the situation of a visibly multi-speed Europe; the referenda-underwritten rejections 
of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005; and the reliable permanence of that hoary old chestnut, 
the democratic deficit.
2
 Considering the intricate, multi-layered, often overlapping and 
somewhat chaotic structure
3
 of the EU, however, it is hardly surprising that the law within its 
boundaries has become stretched to the point where its own character has been laid open to 
criticism. It is my contention, however, that these irregularities should not necessarily be 
perceived as overwhelmingly negative circumstances, particularly (although not exclusively) 
as the European legal integration process is an ongoing one.  
In this chapter I intend to utilise insights drawn from the theory of autopoietic social 
systems in order to illustrate how strength can be located in these perceived weaknesses, that 
the outcome of the legal integration process can be flexibility instead of instability, and that 
fragmentation can be operationalised to facilitate a more contemporary realisation of law vis-
à-vis integration in the European Union. This systems-theoretical approach recognizes that 
the path followed by European legal integration thus far has been a functional one, and 
proposes that European legal integration be reconceptualised as a form of social learning that 
is facilitated and indeed driven by ongoing processes of legal system-internal differentiation. 
This internal differentiation of the Rechtssystem occurs on the dual bases of jurisdiction 
                                                 
2
 The political nature of these setbacks can be contrasted with the continuity of case law from the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), all of which stands on the substantial shoulders of Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62 [1963] 
ECR 1) and Costa v. ENEL (Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585). As this chapter will argue, this jurisprudential 
stability stakes a plausible claim to be considered the main legal unifying force within the EU. 
3
 This is no pejorative judgement in the sense of Allott’s unbearable Ungeheuer (Allott: 2003) or Krisch’s 
‘constitutional monstrosity’ (Krisch: 2005), merely an observation that the EU lacks a well-ordered and 
coherence structure.  
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(territorial application) and legal field or ‘sector’ (for example, contract law, competition law, 
etc) – what I will refer to as ‘double fragmentation’. As I aim to illustrate, this ‘double 
fragmentation’ thesis provides for an understanding of the legal integration process within the 
EU as one premised upon the maintenance of a unity/diversity balance. 
Before providing these illustrations, however, it is necessary first of all to establish what is 
meant by the legal integration process within the EU, specifically in terms of what it does and 
does not include within its ambit. One of the first scholarly ports of call in this regard is 
usually the 1986 Integration through Law (ITL) project (Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler 
1986), and in this my chapter is no different. However, and while it is certainly not an 
exaggeration to state that the Integration through Law project has been immensely formative 
over the past quarter century, its enduring influence can perhaps be measured more in terms 
of how it constructed and shaped the contemporary academic debate than in terms of its 
operation as a reliable forecaster of future developments. I will argue that the ITL project’s 
major insight was what they recognised as their ‘existential dilemma’, namely the 
achievement of a unity/diversity balance, but that this insight was contaminated by the very 
narrative of integration within the EU. The rhetoric of integration through law added an 
inherently instrumentalist aspect to the project, which in turn led to the inclusion of a 
normative ideal motivated by the prevailing political attitudes and dominant ideologies of the 
time.
4
 In terms of the contemporary EU, therefore, and within which it can arguably be said 
that integration has ‘passed its high tide and is turning towards flexibility’ (Nuotio 2004), it is 
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 See also Matej Avbelj’s contribution to this volume, infra chapter 2 that distinguishes between a policy and an 
academic conception of integration through law. 
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my contention that the current state of affairs is better served by a new narrative, namely that 
of the Europeanization of law. 
The reasoning behind utilising this particular term ‘Europeanization’ is twofold. First, it is 
inherently neutral vis-à-vis any notion of amalgamation – integration, harmonization and 
convergence all retain the idea of an eventual endpoint, however far distantly projected that 
may be. It is this intrinsic lack of any specified ultimate aim or finalité that makes 
‘Europeanization’ the optimum term to employ in attempting to conceptualize the contested 
and fragmented European legal project. Second, Europeanization of law can be said to 
concern itself not only with the ‘principal legal effects of European integration’ (Snyder 
2000) but also with the ongoing process itself. The Europeanization of law process can be 
considered an interactive one, meaning that both the process and any results generated by it – 
be they intentional or unforeseen, occurring at either domestic or EU level – are retained 
within the operations of that process and continue to inform it. 
This chapter will discuss the benefits of adopting the narrative ‘Europeanization of law’, 
and will subsequently rely upon these insights to argue that not only can this Europeanization 
be seen as embodying open-ended and juridified processes of social learning but also, as I 
mentioned earlier, that these processes can be described more exactly by drawing upon the 
epistemology of systems theory (Přibáň 2009), specifically as regards the legal system 
(Rechtssystem, understood in the systems-theoretical sense of the term) and its own system-
internal differentiation. Prior to embarking on a discussion of double fragmentation and what 
I will refer to as the ‘balance thesis’, however, some attention should be paid at this juncture 
to the ITL instrumentalist approach, replacing as it did the original convergence thesis of the 
1960s and 70s. 
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‘Integration through Law’ and Instrumentalism 
The path of integration for the entity that was to become the European Union was not always 
such a contested one; in its earlier years the dominant line of thinking was that a gradual 
growing-together of the European Member States would eventually culminate in their 
replacement by a European (federal) State conceived in line with the Westphalian model. 
Prevalent during the 1960s and 70s, this essentially neo-functionalist approach to the 
integration project was often referred to as the ‘Monnet Method’, and operated from the 
assumption that integration processes in one sector would ‘spill-over’ into other sectors, 
specifically the political, where they would then influence and drive similar developments 
(Haas 1958, see also Fischer 2000). This unitary vision foresaw European development 
occurring by means of incremental change and cumulative effects, starting with simple 
economic interdependency through the operation of the common market but culminating in 
full political union. This (comparative) consensus was not to last, however; even by the late 
1980s the EU landscape had already undergone substantial developments certainly 
unanticipated by its founding fathers, and by the early 1990s (post-Maastricht) it was striking 
the degree to which ideas of an ‘ever closer Union’ – once considered a viable socio-political 
reality – had receded. Appearing in its stead was the more nuanced aim of balancing ‘unity in 
diversity’ within the EU; indeed, despite its removal from the defunct 2004 Constitutional 
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Treaty and its 2009 Lisbon successor, the former motto ‘united in diversity’5 remains de facto 
the ‘verbal logo’ of the EU, featuring on all European Parliamentary documents since 2008.6 
So where do the proponents of the Integration through Law project stand on this matter? 
As mentioned earlier, the introduction to the ITL project opens by stating that the ‘existential 
dilemma’ it faced was in reconciling, ‘on the one hand, a respect for the individual unit, 
freedom of choice, pluralism and a diversity of action, and, on the other hand, the societal 
need for cooperation, integration, harmony and, at times, unity.’ (Cappelletti, Seccombe and 
Weiler (1986:4). It could even be said that the role of law and the legal system in the 
realisation of this state of balance between the competing forces of unity and diversity, as 
well as the recognition of the interdependency and interconnectedness of law with the 
European polity and political system, formed the core of what has become the ITL maxim, 
namely that law is both the object and instrument or agent of integration (Cappelletti, 
Seccombe and Weiler 1986, Dehousse and Weiler 1990). Of course, the ITL proponents were 
well aware of the complexities inherent to the notion of European legal integration; not only 
was it already appreciated that the concept comprised two elements, namely both the process 
                                                 
5
 The English translation of the motto in varietate unitas was originally given as ‘unity in diversity’ but this was 
written into the failed 2004 European Constitution (Art I-8) as ‘united in diversity’, and it is this version that has 
been maintained. See also Declaration 52 of the Consolidated EU Treaties. 
6
 Interestingly, the preamble to the Lisbon Treaty takes a slightly different tack, preferring instead to refer to a 
‘[desire] to deepen the solidarity between [their] peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their 
traditions.’ Without putting too much emphasis on the semantics of a multi-lingual document, the complete 
omission of any reference to ‘unity’ appears a rather stark one; the notion of solidarity among people seems to 
be simultaneously more organic and abstract than the perhaps more formal or rigid idea of unity, in whichever 
form. 
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of integrating and the outcome of that process, but it was also recognized that ‘integration’ 
accommodated a conceptual spectrum that situated mere cooperation and full unification at 
its opposite ends.  
I submit, however, that it is by means of this cooperation/unification spectrum that the 
instrumentality inherent to the ITL approach becomes more clearly apparent, the reason being 
that any single point on this spectrum could occupy the foremost position, be it unification, 
harmonization, convergence, and so on and so forth. Indeed, whichever of these is selected, it 
is necessarily a selection, one that was chosen from many possible options to become the 
‘aim’ of the integration process, its normative ideal. This situation appears to arise as a result 
of the difficulty of applying any legal standardization to a concept that lacks a specific value 
– or at least one that can be objectively measured; in essence, the spectrum provides for a 
range of options that remain unavoidably indeterminate. Indeterminacy appears at the point 
of introduction of any social objective or aim of European integration; therefore, by 
instrumentalizing law in order to achieve any such aim, the law becomes complicit in what is 
essentially an ideological exercise.
7
  
It is not the specific ideology as such that introduces indeterminacy; rather, the 
instrumentalism inherent to the very notion of integration through law engenders a certain 
ambiguity vis-à-vis the aim of the process, which in essence becomes a ‘social instrument, 
harnessed to achieve a wider societal objective’ (Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler 1986:42). 
This instrumentalist conception seems to have snuck in on the coattails of Van Gend en Loos 
Case 26/62) and Costa (Case 6/64). By virtue of its apparent commitment to the 
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 Augenstein, infra chapter 5, pinpoints the creation of a European identity as the pivotal societal aim of the 
Integration through Law School. 
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jurisprudential stability created by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the continuity of 
its case law, the ITL project managed to yoke itself to the doctrines of direct effect and 
supremacy, thus inadvertently entangling itself with perhaps more of a ‘convergence thesis’ 
than initially intended or desired. Conceivably most ironic in this regard, however, is that the 
lauded jurisprudential cohesion engendered by the ECJ (Van Gerven 2008) can be seen as 
being directly attributable to a common ideological stance on the part of the ECJ judiciary – 
this is a point I will return to when discussing epistemic communities later in this chapter.  
The result of this instrumentality is that the conceptualisation of integration becomes a 
more normative or, rather, ideologically-influenced one, but it could also be argued that the 
relationship here is one of circularity: the instrumental approach facilitates the inclusion of a 
normative ideal, but the necessity of selecting (from the cooperation/unification spectrum) 
what is to embody this said normative ideal introduces a degree of indeterminacy, which in 
turn serves to open the process up and generate some of the flexibility and fragmentations 
that have characterised the post-Maastricht European Union. Indeed, the dismissal of the 
notion of an ‘ever closer Union’ and the introduction of the new aim of ‘unity in diversity’, 
with the alteration of the sound-bite marking a clear shift in the integrationist ideology,
8
 for 
want of a better term, had the effect of embedding indeterminacy at the heart of its normative 
ideal. As mentioned above, not only does this serve to exemplify the fluidity of 
‘integrationist’ social objectives, but its position as the new placeholder has the effect of 
adding yet another layer of indeterminacy, namely the notion of maintaining a situation of 
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 Even if the machinations behind the scenes are not representative of this; for an argument outlining the 
instrumental usage of the 1992 TEU cultural policy as an integrative force, see Hendry 2008. 
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plurality within the European Union.
9
 This new aim represented a fresh point on the 
cooperation/unification spectrum that was, strangely enough, far more representative of the 
ITL project’s initial acknowledgment of the object/agent duality within the concept of 
integration. Indeed, while ‘unity in diversity’ appeared to be a far more suitable, nuanced and 
balanced normative ideal for the EU to have adopted, it was this adoption and then the 
subsequent recognition of the malleability of integration’s social objective – its ‘placeholder’ 
character – that made the greatest contribution in terms of what are perceived as being the 
EU’s contemporary irregularities and fragmentations.  
Following the format of Dehousse and Weiler’s object/agent distinction (1990), 
integration can in turn be posited as both the (meta-level) object (however unspecified) and 
agent (driving force behind) of this ultimate endpoint, this normative politico-social 
objective. Indeed, this decoupling of process and aim serves to make the duality of the term 
‘integration’ even more readily apparent. In terms of my argument in favour of the narrative 
of ‘Europeanization’, this is also the means by which a critical openness is introduced into its 
ongoing process(es). More will be made of this point later, during the discussion on the 
narrative of Europeanization as an alternative to that of integration; for now the focus will 
shift to address allegations of fragmentation within the EU. 
 
Axes of Difference and Differentiation 
                                                 
9
 The plurality referred to here, it should be said, is not the pluralism of legal anthropology but, rather, the 
existence and indeed maintenance of a multiplicity of legal orders, namely those of the Member States and the 
EU itself, within a single overarching legal space, that of the EU.   
10 
 
 
 
As mentioned above, these irregularities within European law and legal integration, and the 
other setbacks suffered by the EU have given rise to mutterings about a crisis. Nonetheless, 
this appears to overstate the matter. Irregularities and obstacles there may be; however, to 
perceive these setbacks as crises – moreover, as existential crises (Kühnhardt 2009) – is to 
misunderstand both the (legal) integration process and the European project itself. As 
Andrew Moravcsik observed (1998:56), within the EU these ‘intense demands for deepening, 
widening, and democratisation have elicited equally intense demands for fragmentation, 
flexibility and differentiation,’ and the resultant ‘growing pains’ are indeed nothing more 
than just that. It is in this spirit that I aim to conceptualize (and subsequently operationalise) 
fragmentation – specifically, the fragmentation that can be observed within the system of law 
in the EU. This argument takes its impetus from the theory of autopoietic social systems or, 
more succinctly, systems theory (e.g. Luhmann 1995, 1997, 2004 and Teubner 1993), the 
reasons being that the functional differentiation inherent to a systems-analysis not only 
facilitates a restricted focus upon the legal system, its environment and the communications 
relevant to it alone, but also provides for a particular understanding of what I call double 
fragmentation, in terms of legal system-internal differentiation (Binnendifferenzierung).  
The main insight of the theory of autopoietic social systems stems from its recognition of 
differentiation on the basis of function, and the fact that it ‘better formulates the temporal, 
functional, and self-referential aspects of European integration and avoids the 
epistemological trap to identify the particular concept of polity, its organisational restraints, 
and institutional hierarchies within the general concept of society’ (Přibáň 2009). In essence, 
systems theory comes into its own when brought to bear on the many facets and foibles of 
EU integration, the path of which up to now can be charted as having followed a functional –
not a constitutional– route (Von Bogdandy 2010). 
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While Niklas Luhmann (2000) considered differentiation on the basis of function to be the 
only viable structural form available to modernity, this is not necessarily the case. The 
functional ‘turn’ is seen as giving rise to society understood as a differentiated unity but, prior 
to this, society progressed through phases of limited differentiation on various bases. In 
contrast to the horizontal form exhibited by functional differentiation, these earlier stages of 
differentiation – segmentation, stratification, and centre/periphery (Luhmann 1997) – were 
predominantly vertical and restricted in their scope by simple geographical limitations. While 
it has been said that the emergence of the EU embodies a shift (Verschiebung) away from the 
segmentary and stratified forms of differentiation that typified the nation State towards an 
increased reliance on differentiation on the basis of function (Kjaer, 2008), it should not be 
assumed that the functional turn marked the end of these early structural forms. This 
notwithstanding, and although Luhmann himself acknowledged (2000) that ‘relics’ persist 
within modern society, he also maintained that these had to be both viewed in light of and 
explained as a consequence of functional differentiation. Modern systems theory, therefore, 
conceptualizes segmentation and stratification as being particular forms of system-internal 
differentiation, and nowhere is this more evident than in the contemporary EU. Its 
supranational character allows for a clear view of the function system of the law, the 
Rechtssystem, in terms of both jurisdiction (territorial application) and sector (specialisation). 
Let me elaborate on this point. For centuries the internal differentiation of law followed 
the political logic of nation States, which is to say that legal differences corresponded to 
national legal orders, and thus territorially-determined jurisdictions. As an example of the 
segmentary form, the global legal system is internally-differentiated into comparatively 
similar units representative of national jurisdictions; furthermore, with segmentation 
occurring on a non-hierarchical basis, each of these units is considered to be equal, 
12 
 
 
 
understood here in the sense of sovereign and non-violable. Indeed, this provides for an 
understanding of law in context. However, considering that 27 of those nation States are now 
simultaneously also Member States of the EU – which, for the same reasons, arguably 
represents yet another legal order and territorial jurisdiction – there is an added layer of 
complexity introduced by necessary and unavoidable interactions and overlaps. This 
complexity, in time-honoured systems-theoretical fashion, then results in a subsequent 
differentiation once more on the basis of function, but this time in a yet more specialised 
form. As Gunther Teubner and Peter Korth (2008:6) state vis-à-vis the EU, ‘the internal 
differentiation of law along national boundaries is now overlain by sectoral fragmentation’. It 
is these axes of differentiation and fragmentation on both sectoral and national grounds, 
which provide the framework for this argument.  
Jurisdiction 
In terms of this twofold legal-system-internal differentiation, the least problematic is that 
which occurs on the basis of jurisdiction, which is to say, the legal-contextual differentiation 
of 27 Member State legal systems within the overarching EU legal order. However, to be 
clear in terms of this systems-analysis, I would like to provide a short explanation as to how 
‘jurisdiction’ is conceptualized here, most particularly in terms of its fundamentally 
geographical basis. I make specific mention of this because autopoiesis theory is most 
commonly utilised in order to provide descriptions of world society (Weltgesellschaft), this 
application being reliant on the idea that differentiation on the basis of function allows for the 
dismissal of geography, not only as the most important agent but as an agent at all (Schütz 
1997). This argument turns on the idea that the systemic elements (communications) that 
pertain to territorial boundaries are communications of the political system alone and thus 
remain ‘unseen’ by the legal system; with the primary system differentiation being based 
13 
 
 
 
upon function instead of territory, the result is that no other function system should be aware 
of nation State boundaries.  
While this is a plausible argument, and one which does privilege the primary functional 
differentiation, it is my contention that just because the territorial boundaries can be viewed 
as political communications concerning the exercise of State sovereignty, this does not 
automatically prevent subsequent secondary communications being informed by concerns 
that have their source in the territorially-bounded Member States. In this regard, it is not too 
much of a stretch to argue that the territorial aspect of a nation State can be ‘understood’ by 
the overarching legal system in terms of that particular national legal order,
10
 that particular 
legal context – indeed, to put this in systems-theoretical terms: the information contained 
within the utterance is conditioned by its context and, vice-versa, the communication is 
assembled by the selector, whose perspective is also coloured by contextual considerations. 
Social and cultural contexts are inherent to communicative acts, and it is from these that 
meaning is derived; in essence, meaning is socially and culturally constructed. The 
jurisdiction of the law of a Member State, the extent or ‘reach’ of its legal order, is 
intrinsically linked to its scope, which is to say, its authority and applicability – by this token 
I would argue that, while it is of course possible to disregard geographical factors as grounds 
for differentiation, insistence on a deliberate dismissal of geography as an agent (Schütz 
1997) is not only wholly unnecessary but also downplays the important role it still plays 
within the European polity.  
                                                 
10
 For the sake of clarity I am using the term ‘system’ to refer to the functionally-differentiated legal system 
(Rechtssystem) in the systems-theoretical sense of the term, whereas the term ‘order’ pertains to those ‘levels’ of 
subsequent system-internal differentiation, namely Member State legal orders or that of the EU. 
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I say Member State specifically here, as this is my focus – it could be said that EU 
Member states are overlain by the inclusive jurisdiction of the EU resulting from its 
supranational character. The multiplicity of jurisdictions within this EU jurisdiction facilitate 
the introduction of considerations of legal plurality, and indeed, legal plurality in two loci,
11
 
namely both within the Member States legal order and the EU legal order. While it could be 
argued that this legal plurality is merely another complicating factor in an already 
indeterminate integration process, I submit that it makes more sense to view it in light of the 
more nuanced normative ideal of (legal) ‘unity in diversity’. My point here is: is it not 
preferable to harness that indeterminacy or, to put it another way, to see within intra-EU legal 
plurality the possibility of conceptualising a legal type of differentiated integration? This 
appears to be possible under a systems-theoretical construction, namely one which provides 
for a selector-specific understanding of a communication: not only is the spectrum of 
differentiated integration across various Member states readily accommodated, but the 
specific context of each Member State legal order is also infused with a particular degree of 
EU influence. Viewed as an ongoing process, moreover, this construction maintains a critical 
openness that encompasses much although importantly not all of the unity/diversity 
spectrum. In this regard it must be held to be a fundamentally diversifying force, however 
weak or strong that may be at any given point.  
 
Sector 
                                                 
11
 The terminological quandary here is to express an overarching inclusive jurisdiction (EU) without suggesting 
subsumption or hierarchy. 
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As the weft to the warp thread of jurisdiction, the other basis of legal-system-internal 
differentiation is perhaps less immediately apparent; it is not reflected by the apparently 
robust borders of national legal orders, but rather in legal academic and professional divisions 
of labour, whereby ‘doctrinal analysis has to some extent been re-domiciled in its relevant 
substantive disciplines’ (Walker 2005: 582). The sectoral axis, therefore, can be construed as 
pertaining to those legal specialisations that are reflected in and by professional legal 
epistemic communities in existence within the EU and operate across national-jurisdictional 
boundaries 
Much of the literature on the concept of epistemic community comes from the field of 
political science.
12
 This does not, however, mean that it cannot be reinterpreted from a legal 
perspective, nor does it prevent the concept being utilised with specific reference to legal 
professionals. For my purposes, ‘epistemic communities’ denote network constellations 
pertaining to specific legal fields, which are subsequently separated out or differentiated into 
sectors of the law, for example, public and private law, contract law, human rights law, 
labour law, and so on and so forth. The term network constellation is utilised deliberately to 
illustrate the amorphous nature of these epistemic communities, which are neither bounded 
nor restricted as regards participation, and which transcend Member State borders. It is my 
assertion that the cross-jurisdictional, sectoral
13
 commonalities embodied by these epistemic 
                                                 
12
 I do not accept this political-scientific definition wholesale but rather rearticulate it vis-à-vis the law. If 
anything, my application is more in keeping with Thomas Kuhn’s ‘thought collective’ (Kuhn 1970), which 
denotes a sociological group with a common style of thinking, than with Peter Haas (1992) four-point definition 
of epistemic community.  
13
 Conceptualising the EU in terms of sectors is not a new approach – for example, John P. McCormick (2007) 
characterises the EU as a State composed of sectors or Sektoralstaat. 
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communities can constitute an alternative form of differentiation to the more readily-accepted 
territorial delimitation in the form of the Member states. This unifying form is simultaneously 
constructed and maintained by one over-arching territorial jurisdiction, namely the EU, yet 
actively countered by the mere existence of those 27 others from which its participants come.  
 
It is easily apparent that individuals working in and with the law are necessarily connected 
with other individuals engaged with the same legal field.
 
While the jurisdictional 
differentiation could be characterised as formal, by virtue of its institutional quality, the 
sectoral differentiation should be understood as more informal, being based upon the 
exchanges and connections between ‘legal’ individuals. Furthermore, this situation cannot be 
said to be one of exclusivity: on the contrary, an individual legal professional or academic 
could be simultaneously involved with European labour law and European social policy, or 
could be working in the field of European constitutionalism while also engaging with public 
law debates within their own Member State legal order. In fact, many of the individual legal 
professions could be viewed as operating in sectorally-defined epistemic communities 
internal to their own Member State legal order as well as operating in EU-level epistemic 
communities. 
As mentioned above, an epistemic community can be described as a constellation or 
network of knowledge-based experts (Haas 1992) namely those professional individuals who 
have a recognized mastery or proficiency within a specific field or area of law. Antoine 
Vauchez (2007) states, this could be articulated as a coincidence of specialisation and 
autonomisation. These different fields or areas of law vary in terms of the degree to which 
they have been ‘Europeanised’: a situation that can be said to stem from both the attention 
these areas receive at the EU level and the nature of a given area’s embeddedness within its 
17 
 
 
 
Member State context. To give an example, it is clear that areas such as environmental law, 
which have a less embedded character than, say, criminal law, are subject to more pan-
European initiatives – the Member state-specificity is less a consideration in this regard than 
it is for an area that is heavily contextual. Similarly, the more technical character of contract 
law can be cited as an example of its (comparative) openness to codification,
14
 while its 
importance to the economic system should also not be downplayed. Nevertheless, there is no 
necessary connection between the degree of ‘Europeanization’ of a particular area of law and 
the scope or interconnectedness of its particular epistemic community; while interest tends to 
coalesce around action, there is nothing that stipulates that this be the case. 
Lawyers can be said to be central to the wider processes of integration of and through law 
within the EU, fulfilling a variety of roles and functions within European affairs as, for 
example: ‘consultants or advisers for national governments or European institutions, as 
experts and academics involved in political or civil society mobilizations, as legal 
practitioners and judges’ (Vauchez 2007: 3). My point here is that the twofold role of the 
‘lawyer’ within the EU facilitates the maintenance of an identity position that is 
simultaneously internal both to their own domestic legal order and to that of the EU. 
Although we should guard against overstating the force of this – the ‘understanding’ is of 
course merely sectoral and thus only partial – it does engender a certain unity across the 
network constellation; for example, it is not such a stretch to assert that Scottish and Italian 
criminal lawyers will have more of a shared mindset
 
(Schäfer and Bańkowski 2000) and 
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 See for example the Study Group on a European Civil Code/Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis 
Group)’s 2009 Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR).  
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interests than they would have with public lawyers in their own domestic jurisdiction, or with 
contract lawyers or academics working on governance. This shared mindset can only be 
achieved by means of exchange; in essence, the connections formed through this type of 
interaction serve to constitute discrete interpretative communities. The engagement of these 
individuals with each other across territorial, spatial and linguistic boundaries exemplifies a 
shift from the purely territorial (jurisdictional) to the epistemic (sectoral). As Schäfer and 
Bańkowski (2003: 491) put it, the European Union ‘does not merely happen by establishing a 
centralised power structure but in the day-to-day transactions of its citizens. Society in this 
picture is not presupposed but emerges out of the totality of individual exchanges’. 
 
This type of fruitful exchange and learning within legal fields and across national 
boundaries by means of epistemic communities can, of course, also supersede the framework 
and/or boundaries of the EU. However, I would argue that, in order for the ‘unifying force’ to 
be in any way meaningful, that there has to be an additional institutional quality that 
underpins these sectorally-defined epistemic communities – it is the ‘EU-ness’, the particular 
character of these constellations, that is important in this regard.
15
 Were this to be lacking, 
then there would be no difference between EU and non-EU epistemic communities, an 
observation that would serve to undermine the notion that the specifically EU ones have any 
‘unificatory’ force (however weak) at all. 
What, then, is it that provides this important normative underpinning? To merely point to 
geography and politics would clearly be insufficient – the former is circumstantial and 
variable, while the latter is similarly inconstant. The answer, I submit, lies in the 
                                                 
15
 On this point see also Daniel Augenstein’s contributions to this volume, infra chapter 4 
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jurisprudential stability provided by the ECJ’s continued commitment to and reliance upon its 
decisions in Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62) and Costa (Case 6/64); this stability stems from 
the continuing importance of the doctrines established by these early cases. Indeed, as 
Vauchez says (2010: 2), it is as if:  
[EU legal] scholarship and ECJ case-law had essentially been about clarifying the scope of 
these two decisions and ascertaining their general acceptance throughout Member States’ 
jurisdictions. Beyond the legal realm, it seems that the very history of the European 
construction lies in the progressive un-folding of these two cases’ ‘potentialities’. 
The bedrock established by these cases, namely the principles of direct effect and supremacy, 
is important on three counts. First, that this jurisprudential stability is something that 
engenders commitment towards it; whether we can point to these as being shared 
fundamental constitutional principles as such is unclear, but they do have a weak normativity 
sufficient to be drawn upon in support of a unifying force.
16
 Second, this stability should not 
be conflated with any form of closure, for the ‘potentialities’ referred to above are as rich as 
ever. This maintains a critical openness within the process of Europeanization, thus providing 
a degree of flexibility despite its normative underpinning. Finally, and from a systems-
theoretical perspective, that these are ECJ decisions allows the analysis to remain legal 
system-internal.   
 
The ‘Balance Thesis’, or the ‘Europeanization’ of law 
Why is this important? More to the point, what do these observations bring to the table, 
particularly in terms of the indeterminacy and fragmentation of European legal integration as 
                                                 
16
 On this point see also Maria Cahill’s and Matej Avbelj’s contributions to this volume, infra chapters 1 and 2. 
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discussed earlier? The answer lies in this sectoral differentiation. If it is conceptualized as 
operating antagonistically to the classic territorial differentiation on the basis of jurisdiction, 
namely a fundamentally diversifying force, then this differentiation in the form of sectorally-
defined epistemic communities represents a unifying force. It is this interaction of conflicting 
forces that gives rise to a situation of dual legal system-internal differentiation or, rather, 
double fragmentation. The diversifying force is, of course, more readily apparent than the 
unifying one – the 27 Member State legal orders provide for this – but the normative 
underpinning offered by the shared fundamental EU legal principles embodied by the ECJ’s 
Van Gend en Loos and Costa decisions cannot be underestimated.  
The ongoing operation of these countervailing forces within the EU legal order serves not 
only to maintain the critical openness of the Europeanization of law process, but also to 
create equilibrium in terms of EU legal unity and legal diversity. Indeed, the beauty of this 
‘balance thesis’ is that the indeterminate normative ideal, that of ‘unity in diversity’, is not 
only achieved but is retained as a goal, an ultimate and impossible endpoint never to be 
realised.
17
 An important and appealing feature of the concept ‘Europeanization’ is that it 
connotes a process without proscribing or conditioning the outcome of that process – in 
essence, this alternative narrative not only avoids the instrumentalism inherent to Integration 
through Law but also manages to operationalize the indeterminacy within the European 
undertaking. In terms of the shift in narrative, the idea that a normatively and culturally 
integrated EU polity would ultimately be achieved or realised should be jettisoned and 
                                                 
17
 This echoes Zenon Bañkowski and Emilios Christodoulidis’ (1998: 342) utilization of the metaphor of an 
endless journey: ‘And because this is an ongoing process, a continuing negotiation, we use the metaphor of a 
journey albeit, as we shall see, one without a destination.’ 
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replaced by a more nuanced and practical one for the contemporary EU reality, namely that 
of unity in diversity; in this regard, the ITL project’s original ‘existential dilemma’ of 
achieving a balance between unity and diversity, their preferred normative ideal, is brought 
to the fore. In providing a means by which such a balance could be achieved, therefore, this 
account of functional differentiation provides a viable systems-theoretical understanding of a 
complex problem, namely that of accommodating fragmentation.  
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